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A special issue of the Journal of American History, intended to marl< the 
bicentennial of the United States constitution in 1987, made "the study of 
rights" the natural starting place for examination of American constitu- 
tionalism. The editor's introduction focused on rights consciousness, 
calling it a pivot of "identity for social groups as they have organized." 
Although he aclmowledged objections to viewing the Constitution as a 
vehicle for extending access to groups excluded from power, nonetheless 
he saw rights consciousness as having been a central means for them "to 
define, assert, and validate their groups' distinctive identities and 
 claim^."^ 
I want to assess the rights claims made by women in particular, in the 
context of the past few decades' criticism of rights discourse. Unprece- 
dented controversy over the suitability of constitutional rights claims to 
advance democratic access has arisen, focusing on the very character of 
rights claims and rights consciousness and the ways these have inflected 
the political order of the United States. I will summarize, hoping for for- 
giveness of my distillations and elisions. 
Critical legal studies began this trend in the late 1960s and 1970s, with 
the perception that rights claims were a double-edged sword, having just 
as much capacity to preserve existing powerful interests as to give new 
legitimacy to the powerless. For a long period of American history from 
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approximately the 1870s to the 1930s, the principal "natural" rights suc- 
cessfully defended in courts were property rights, in the hands of indi- 
vidual and corporate wealth-holderse3 The Supreme Court in that era 
embraced the doctrine that "there are individual rights resting on a nat- 
ural basis, to which courts must give effect," in the words of one Progres- 
sive-era critic. Yet the Court offered no opposition when states kept 
women from being lawyers or voters as men were, or white mobs pre- 
vented blacks from voting, or Congress excluded Chinese immigrants 
while allowing in Europeansa4 The Court's record in this period on the 
civil rights of minority groups, women, and workers failed to accord with 
the universalistic pretensions of rights theory. The defense of property 
rights, especially as embodied in the doctrine of "liberty of contract" 
between employer and employee, trumped group rights claims, serving 
to curtail expansions of state power on behalf of the dispossessed and to 
limit the latter's ability to assert collectively-or individually-claimed 
rights. 
Following the legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s, critical legal theo- 
rists emphasized that so-called private rights did not emerge from 
"nature" but resulted from social and legal construction that had to be 
maintained by the state in order to exist. If rights and freedoms could be 
exercised, that was not because they sprang up naturally or privately but 
rather because the state protected these rights and freedoms, either gener- 
ally or selectively - by recognizing and upholding the rights and thereby 
privileging their possessors. Critical legal analysts declined to accept the 
picture of the world in which private and public realms were clearly dis- 
cernable and separate, the former the realm of exercise of rights and 
freedom, the latter the realm of coercion by state power. Since the exer- 
cise of so-called private rights or freedoms by their possessors had social 
consequences - consequences for all in the society - to see these rights as 
3. The following precis of Critical Legal Studies draws on my general reading in the work of many scholars, 
especially Robert W. Gordon, Morton J. Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, Frances W. Olsen, and Robin West; my 
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Yue Tiizg v. U.S., 149 U S .  698 (1893). The Progressive-era quotation is from Roscoe Pound, "Liberty of Con- 
tract," Yale Law Journal, 18 (1909), 454, at n67. 
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a private matter was to mask the operations of state power and the rela- 
tive advantages and disadvantages for different groups in the existing 
system. 
According to this line of argument, liberal rights discourse had encour- 
aged several counterproductive dichotomies - not only dividing private 
from public, but also self from other, individual from community. Critical 
legal theorists deplored the individualism of rights claims. Rights were 
premised on "ownership," on the model of the possessive individual, the 
model which underlay capitalist accumulation and separated the indi- 
vidual from social networks. If the legal system posited a world of atom- 
istic individuals who defended or asserted rights for themselves in rela- 
tion to the public realm of the state, that prevented a more accurate por- 
trayal of the way that interest groups (of unequal power) contended with 
one another and jockeyed for power and leverage within the state frame- 
work. Such a model also reified rights, so that one person's or group's 
rights were set against another's, offering no guidance on how to resolve 
conflicts between competing rights. 
Also, critical legal theorists contended that from the point of view of 
disempowered social groups intending to mobilize for change in the 
system, strategies reliant on claims of rights had a boomerang effect. 
These strategies were counterproductive and undercut disempowered 
groups' own stated aims, because rights claims in a liberal framework 
could promote only formal or procedural gains and not substantive jus- 
tice. The adoption of rights claims put the brakes on militancy, it was 
argued - by inducing the disempowered to accept the state's predefined 
goals and to become more passive, awaiting the state's grant of entitle- 
ments. The translation of transformative political vision into the legal 
argumentation necessary to attain rights whittled down the process of 
political mobilization itself. Instead of transforming the system, the dissi- 
dent group was coopted into it. 
In the later 1970s and 1980s, feminists and critical race theorists con- 
tested some of the starkest of these accusations and countered the bleak- 
ness of this vision of rights, in part, while extending the critique in other 
directions by focusing on the chavacter of the individual envisioned in 
earlier liberal rights claims. In American political theory (as in the 
Western canon generally), the "individual" who is seen as endowed with 
inherent rights is abstractly conceived. Abstracted from social context, 
this "individual" has no social referents and social situatedness. The 
political theory of social contract underlying this theoretical move posits 
a pre-social human individual, a human who arose without there being a 
group or society (to say nothing of a specific mother and father) sus- 
taining him or her; it imagines an individual who need not be specified as 
him or her, indeed, because the individual has no gender, no race, no 
other marking attributes. It imagines that this abstract individual stands 
for, serves as a proxy for all varieties of actual human individuals. 
Yet, as feminists pointed out in the 1970s, a neuter being is logically 
and historically impossible; an abstraction such as this dodges the reality 
that any individual is situated socially and historically. The abstract indi- 
vidualism of Western political theory has masked the (actual) particu- 
larity of the "individual," who is not "man" in the most general and inclu- 
sive sense of all humanity but a man, and undoubtedly a white man, and, 
traditionally, a grown man, a head of household. The scalpel of gender 
analysis has peeled back the logic of abstract individualism to reveal that 
the theorized individual is not neuter, but situated, h im~e l f .~  
The larger point here - in critical race theory as well as in feminist cri- 
tiques - is not simply about neutrality vs. situatedness or unmarkedness 
vs. descriptive markings. It is about relative power. The individual rights- 
holder is unmarked in theory, yet what allows him to appear as such is his 
being an adult white male head of a household, who has power over 
others. This remains unacknowledged in canonical rights theory. More- 
over, the subordination of those who are not "in the place of the indi- 
vidual" is part of what constructs the very position and (unacknowl- 
edged) power of the normative individual. Those who are not white male 
heads of household are not only differently situated; their subordination 
is part of what gives the abstracted rights-holder his independent posi- 
tion. 
Sharp criticism of the individualism of rights claims unites critics such 
as these with critics who in other respects seem far more conservative, 
such as Mary Anne G l e n d ~ n . ~  Perhaps Glendon's insightful and often 
5. Landmarks in the extensive feminist political science literature on this issue are Susan Moller Okin, 
Wonzen in Westeiiz Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton U .  Pr., 1979) and Carole Pateman, Tlze Sexual 
Contract (Stanford, Stanford U.P., 1988). 
6. Mary Ann Glendon, Rigizts Talk: The Inzpoverishnzeizt of Political Discourse (N.Y., Free Press, 1991). 
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eloquent analysis of rights discourse in Rights Talk does not belong on 
the "right" wing conventionally conceived. Indeed, the spectrum of criti- 
cisms battering rights discourse measures the unsuitability of "right" and 
"left" terminology to demarcate current distinctions in American polit- 
ical discourse. As compared to critical legal theorists, critical race theo- 
rists, and feminists, however, Glendon's (and also communitarians') crit- 
icisms of rights discourse fall on the conservative side. They are conser- 
vative in expressing (implicitly if not explicitly) a nostalgia and yearning 
for past times when there weren't so many disparate individuals and 
groups jostling in the open, stating their own injuries and pressing their 
own claims; a time when it was expected and more lilcely for the disem- 
powered to accept the disparity of power in the hands of others as though 
it were for the common good-- as though their own subordination fos- 
tered the interests of a common good, whether the commonality was the 
family, the neighborhood, or the nation. 
Glendon laments and condemns the individualism of rights discourse, 
focusing on the cost or sacrifice not to the politics of the disempowered 
but rather the general civility of society, the mutual obligations of each to 
all. She invokes the touchstones of conservative lament, words such as 
responsibility, morality, virtue, family. Yet Glendon is no standard con- 
servative; her critique has more in common with the republican values of 
the founders of the United States, when they exalted civic virtue over pri- 
vate aims. Her views have much in common with the Scottish school of 
moral philosophy of the late eighteenth century also influential among 
American revolutionaries - a school of thought since labeled the "conser- 
vative Enlightenment." These thinkers believed in natural rights, but saw 
natural rights as holding sway only in tandem with corollary duties. 
Rejecting the individualism of contractarian thinking, they stressed moral 
obligation and the preservation of social harmony over individual 
autonomy - duty, over libertya7 
Glendon can be seen as their descendent, for she also puts the interests 
of social harmony first, though she does not accept the extent of 
inequality in its service that they did. Her critique, while it is carried on 
7. On the Scottish moralists, see Henry May, Tize Enligiztennzent iizAmei.ica (N.Y., Oxford, 1976), pp. 342- 
37; Rosemarie Zagarri, "Morals, Manners and the Republican Mother," American Quarterly, 44 (June 1992), 
pp. 192-215, and Rosemarie Zagmi, "The Rights of Man and Woman in Post-Revolutionary America," Wil- 
lianz andMary Quarterly 3d ser. 5 5 2  (April 1998), pp. 213-16. 
mainly with respect to law, thrusts into the heart what might simplisti- 
cally but conveniently be called Reaganism, the attitude toward society 
and progress that asla only one egoistic and inevitably dollar-laden ques- 
tion, "am I better off than I was?" (Ronald Reagan, running for a second 
term as president of the United States, advised citizens to look back over 
the four years he had served and ask themselves this question in order to 
assess whether to keep him in office for another four years.) Glendon 
puts the specimen of late twentieth century American society on the table 
and makes it squirm for celebrating self-development, free choice, and 
personal advantage while neglecting social relationships, cooperation, 
and communication, although this latter triad is as vital as the first is to 
achieving democracy in a heterogeneous society. 
This has been a long way around to the question of rights claims by 
women. Despite the astute objections I have recounted, I would nonethe- 
less contend that rights claims have been absolutely essential to the emer- 
gence of women to full citizenship in the United States. (I mean the word 
citizenship here in the broadest sense, to refer to formal empowerment 
and to public participation.) The critical perspectives I've alluded to have 
been very salutary. They have opened eyes and sharpened thinking. 
Debates over the limits and the pitfalls of rights claims beckon toward 
multifaceted thinking and lead toward renovation. It is always advanta- 
geous to see accustomed strategies in a critical light, so as not to assume 
that they are the inevitable or only route. But rights claims must be con- 
sidered historically as well as logically. The discourse of rights has a 
praxis as well as a theory. Abandoning rights discourse would risk 
throwing out the baby with the bath water, to use a very peculiar collo- 
quial phrase that seems to fit. Am I simply saying (to use another liquid 
metaphor) that rights claims are not a half empty glass, but one that is 
half full? No. I want to argue that rights discourse has been more genera- 
tive and energizing than that image implies. It is a full glass, but taking it 
in, like drinking anything potent, may have unanticipated consequences. 
Let me discuss some of the history that brings me to my view. To the 
ears of most people in the United States, "women's rights" and "equal 
rights" are more or less interchangeable phrases - with "equal rights" 
meaning the same rights men have. This equation has been fairly stan- 
dard since the nineteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920 
prohibited sex discrimination in enfranchisement. The question hovers in 
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the shadows, nonetheless, whether the rights women want are the very 
same rights that men have. When Mary Wollstonecraft in England fol- 
lowed the French revolution's declaration of the rights of man and 
Thomas Paine's book called The Rights of Man with her own treatise in 
1792 called A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, she portrayed these 
rights as distinctive, while drawing on a common fund. She condemned 
the "tyranny of man" in confining the "rights of humanity . . . to the male 
line from Adam downward," thus indicating her belief in the existence of 
shared, universal, human rights; yet her treatise focused on improving 
women's access to education and occupations, in order for them to be 
lcnowledgeable mothers, companions of men, and members of society. 
Wollstonecraft saw rights as "inseparable" from duties - and she 
assumed that the duties of women were different from those of men. Yet 
she had made a great leap, in figuring women as rights-bearers who were 
unjustly excluded from public life and from public structures of opportu- 
nity. 
As Rosemary Zagarri has emphasized, Wollstonecraft's very "invoca- 
tion of rights language ... heightened the power of her claims" by 
endowing women with "the moral authority to criticize existing institu- 
tions" and to demand more opportunities than they had. Her conservative 
opponent at the time, Hannah More, sniffed that Wollstonecraft had 
adopted "the imposing term of rights" in order "to sanctify the claims of 
our female pretenders." In the new United States, citizens began to speak 
of women's rights after Wollstonecraft published her book - not before. 
They so often conflated the rights of women with particular female duties 
and destiny, however, that "the rights of woman" differed from those of 
manag A New Hampshire minister expressed this leaning in his demo- 
cratic confidence that in the United States, "Every man, by the constitu- 
tion, is born with an equal right to be elected to the highest office. And 
every woman, is born with an equal right to be the wife of the most emi- 
nent manDg 
8. This is Zagarri's argument in "The Rights of Man and Woinai~"; she quotes Wollstonecraft and More, pp. 
207-08. 
9. John Cosens Ogden, The Fenzale Guide (Concord, N.H., 1793), p. 26, quoted in Nancy E Cott, Tlze 
Bonds of Wonzaizhood (New Haven, Yale Univ. P., 1977), p. 109 (also quoted by Zagarri, "Rights of Man and 
Woman," p. 218). 
The discourse of inherent rights did offer the solidest ground to argue for 
extending political and economic privileges to all white men. So relied 
upon for that purpose, the discourse of rights was like a genie let out of 
the bottle when once it was applied to women - it could not again be 
properly contained.1° When organized claimants for women's rights 
appeared within the anti-slavery movement in the 1840s, they had the 
moral authority and the political indignation of rights discourse at their 
fingertips. In conjunction with abolitionists' demand for slaves' natural 
rights to possess themselves, women's rights claims, too, began to flow 
in an individualist mode. Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote in 1857, "When 
we talk of woman's rights, is not the right to her person, to her happiness, 
to her life, the first on the list? If you go to a southern plantation and 
speak to a slave of his right to property, to the elective franchise, to a 
thorough education, his response will be a vacant stare . . . The great idea 
of his right to himself, to his personal dignity, must first take possession 
of his soul."11 
This emphasis on self-possession (an idea that critical legal theorists 
deplore in rights discourse) arose among antebellum advocates of 
women's rights in part from the abolitionist context but also from their 
understanding of the position of wives under the Anglo-American 
common law. Lucy Stone repeatedly objected to the common-law doc- 
trine of marriage for giving "the 'custody' of the wife's person to her hus- 
band, so that he has a right to her even against herself."' To her friend 
Antoinette Brown Blackwell, Stone wrote that "the real question" for 
their movement, underlying all "little skirmishing for better laws" was, 
"has woman, as wife, a right to herself?" To her, property and voting 
would mean "very little ... if I may not keep my body, and its uses, in my 
absolute right. Not one wife in a thousand can do that now, & so long as 
she suffers this bondage, all other rights will not help her to her true posi- 
tion."12 
After the Civil War, women's rights leaders began to focus more inten- 
10. This is Zagarri's metaphor in "The Rights of Man and Woman," p. 224. 
11. Quoted from an 1857 letter of Stanton to Susan B. Anthony in Hendrik Hartog, "The Constitution of 
Aspiration and 'The Rights That Belong to Us All,"'Jouri?al ofAmericaiz History 74:3 (Dec. 1987), p. 1018. 
12. Quoted in Leslie Wheeler, ed. Loving Warriors: Selected Letters ofLucy Stone andHeizr); B.  Blaclnuell, 
1853 to 1893 (NY, Dial, 1981), p. 186. 
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sively on the vote. The political context - the ending of slavery by con- 
stitutional amendment, and the Radical Republicans' moves to put civil 
rights and then political rights for the freedmen into the constitution - 
was crucial here too. The contest over slavery did more than anything 
else, as Hendrik Hartog has noted, to invest the constitution with a rights- 
conscious interpretation. The small but determined group of women's 
rights advocates were inspired by the thirteenth amendment's abolition of 
the centuries-long bondage of African-Americans to imagine that the 
constitution should also remove the civil and political incapacities of 
women. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony took to heart the 
Radical Republicans' assertion that voting was a fundamental right of 
freedmen as citizens and argued that voting was a fundamental right of 
women citizens too - the right from which all others would flow. 
The American polity was founded on emancipatory premises and 
promises in which the discourse of individual rights was embedded. Yet 
the fundamental political texts of the United States had not spelled out 
who are the rights-holders, nor actually defined their rights. The abstrac- 
tion and putative universalism of the founding documents of the United 
States have sponsored aspirations as much as they have masked inequal- 
ities, and have made it inevitable, necessary, and rewarding for individ- 
uals or groups who see themselves excluded to use rights claims. This 
has been crucial in the many phases of women's movements. 
The fact that the quantity and content of rights are not fixed has helped 
to goad the liberatory efforts of many newcomers. New groups who come 
into voice have visualized rights and needs from unconventional perspec- 
tives and have pushed for new definitions. In the early twentieth century, 
more kinds of women than ever before became interested in "rights," for 
many reasons - wage-earning women, to push for labor legislation; 
African-American women, to fight against lynching; middle-class social 
reformers, to solve urban problems; aspiring professionals, to push sex 
discrimination from their occupational paths. During the height of the 
suffrage movement in the 1910s these diverse types all asserted their 
equal right to the vote, and the younger generation (some of them college 
graduates, some political radicals), announced further demands in the 
language of rights: a woman's right to work, the right to equal wages, the 
right to her own name, the right to sexual expression, the right to a single 
standard of sexual morality. These women, in the 1910s' grouped their 
demands together and called their approach feminism, a word unknown 
to Stanton or Anthony.13 
In retrospect, we can see that the outcome of this invigorating period of 
women's rights agitation was not revolutionary. It could be said that the 
aftermath of the woman suffrage movement is a case in point for critical 
legal theorists' objections to rights strategies. Feminists' more venture- 
some definitions of rights (intended to address sexual and economic 
inequalities between women and men) were not written into the constitu- 
tion, and women's formal access to the ballot by itself did not transform 
the gender order. The aftermath to the nineteenth amendment (like the 
aftermath to the fifteenth amendment which was supposed to guarantee 
the vote to black men) pointed up the disparity between rights stipulated 
and rights enacted. Black women followed black men in suffering the 
indignities and the terrors of disfranchisement, despite what the amended 
constitution said. Women of all descriptions found that formal admission 
to full citizenship did not even mean they would be called to serve on 
juries on the same terms as men; nor mean they could gain political 
office, when major parties would not run them. Enfranchised women 
were supposed to have had their demands satisfied, thus be equally 
assimilated into the existing political structure-- yet they were still lesser 
citizens. 
During the process of mobilization, however, rights discourse had 
been enormously enlivening and empowering to women in the move- 
ment. Claims to "women's rights" however defined had been essential to 
women's seeing themselves as a group and forming a mass movement 
through strategic coalition. Although neither the suffrage nor other sur- 
rounding liberatory aims before 1920 revolutionized the public sphere, it 
would be a mistake to weight too lightly the accomplishments that were 
gained. The shape of most women's lives in the twentieth century has dif- 
fered vastly from their forbears in the nineteenth, and a hefty part of that 
difference has been due to the reshaping of public discourse and life pos- 
sibilities by women's claims to equality of rights. 
For women (and perhaps for all who have been prevented from seeing 
themselves in the abstract individual and from being seen thus, because 
their subordinate otherness has been implied in the construction of that 
13. See Nancy F. Cott, The Groundiizg of Moderiz Feminisnz (Kew Haven, Yale U.P., 1987), chapter 1 
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individual) - individualistic rights claims have been the necessary route 
to graduate, so to speak, into consciousness of entitlement and public 
voice. Individualistic rights claims operating in tandem with a sense of 
group oppression have been the main engine of modern social move- 
ments in U.S. history. 
Women activists have been among the most creative on the shifting 
landscape of rights definitions. The women's movement of the 1960s and 
1970s catapulted still more rejuvenated concepts of rights on to the polit- 
ical stage: reproductive rights; welfare rights; the right to equal pay for 
comparable worth, for example. Freedom from sexual harassment on the 
job; maternity leave; equal educational and athletic facilities - all these 
demands were pursued in the language of rights, and to the extent they 
were accomplished, it was through claims to rights (usually those 
expressed in the Civil War-era fourteenth amendment). 
This seemingly infinite extension of the horizon of rights - the map- 
ping of rights language on to all demands or desires by all self-defined 
groups - is exactly what Glendon finds pernicious. It seems to me that 
when the group in question is called "women" the greater stumbling 
block is not "rights" themselves but the notion of "equality" in them. 
Many people assume "equal" means "exactly the same." The notion that 
women's rights should be the same as men's makes people uncomfort- 
able, when they feel that women are different from men. This was the 
core reason that the Equal Rights Amendment, passed by both houses of 
Congress in 1972, failed to be ratified by two-thirds of the states to 
become part of the constitution. The dilemma of sameness and difference 
that dogged the women's movement in the 1970s and 1980s was exacer- 
bated, no doubt, by the ideological structure of rights discourse itself. In 
truth women are both the same as men and different from men. (I 
remember the 1970s slogan: women who want to be equal to men lack 
imagination.) The abstract individualism on which rights claims are 
premised has a very hard time accommodating that paradox. 
Yet, with history the context for my view, I agree with Elizabeth 
Schneider's assessment that rights claims have not been counterproduc- 
tive or self-exhausting in feminist political mobilization but have oper- 
ated in fruitful dialectic with it.14 Rights claims have effectively 
14. Schneider, "The Dialectic of Rights and Politics;" 
expressed the political and moral aspirations of feminist social move- 
ments, fostering collective consciousness among women and also very 
importantly shaping larger public discourse. As individualistic as rights 
claims are, they have been a bonding glue for social movements. While 
Glendon deplores rights talk for leading away from sociality and cooper- 
ation, it is this very way in which rights talk has served as social glue - 
for particularized movements - that rankles her, as it rankles other critics 
who blame "identity politics" for fragmenting the political culture of the 
United States. Hartog's insight offers a better perspective: if so many 
fractious groups in the United States all translate their goals into the lan- 
guage of constitutional rights, that is something that binds them 
together.15 It unites them in a shared constitutional culture. 
15. Hartog, "The Constitution of Aspiration," esp. 1015-16. 
